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Abstract
Keystroke dynamics refer to information about the typ-
ing patterns of individuals, such as the relative timing when
the individual presses and releases each key. Prior studies
suggest that such patterns are unique and cannot be easily
imitated. This lays the foundation for the use of keystroke
biometrics in authentication systems. The research effort in
this area has thus far focused on novel detection techniques
to differentiate between legitimate users and imposters. In
this paper, we demonstrate a novel feedback and training
interface named Mimesis. Mimesis provides both positive
and negative feedback on the differences between a submit-
ted pattern vs. a reference pattern. This allows one per-
son to imitate another through incremental adjustment of
typing pattern. We show that even for targets whose typing
patterns are only partially known, training with Mimesis al-
lows attackers to defeat one of the best anomaly detection
engines using keystroke biometrics. For a group of 84 par-
ticipants playing the role of attackers and 2 eight-character
passwords of different difficulty, the false acceptance rate
(FAR) of the easy and difficult password increases from 0.24
and 0.20 respectively (before Mimesis training) to 0.63 and
0.42 respectively (after Mimesis training with partial infor-
mation of the victim). With full information, the FAR in-
creases to 0.99 for both passwords for the 14 best attackers.
1. Introduction
Biometrics are the oldest form of authentication; peo-
ple verify each other on telephone based on voice, humans
recognize each other by face when they meet. There is a
wide variety of candidate characteristics, including facial
features, speech patterns, hand geometry [8], fingerprints,
iris scans, DNA, typing patterns, signature geometry1 and
mouse dynamics. These biometrics can be classified into
1Signature geometry encompasses not just the look of the signature, but
also possibly the pen pressure, signature speed, etc.
two major categories: 1) physiological biometric – a bio-
metric that is based on a physical trait of an individual,
e.g., facial features, hand geometry, fingerprints, iris scans,
and DNA; and 2) behavioral biometric – a biometric that is
based on the behavioral trait of an individual, e.g., speech
patterns, typing patterns, signatures, and mouse dynamics.
A central issue2 of biometrics security concerns the
uniqueness of the biometrics feature. In the context of fin-
gerprint biometrics for example, there had been cases where
suspects were wrongly identified through fingerprints [10].
For keystroke biometrics, prior literature had shown that al-
though typing patterns between individuals do overlap, and
misidentification is possible as in fingerprinting, the error
rates are low enough such that typing patterns can be con-
sidered unique to each individual [7, 14, 21, 17, 16].
In this paper, we question the uniqueness property of
keystroke biometrics. We consider the scenario where at-
tackers are shown the typing pattern3 of their victims and
make a conscious attempt to imitate. If imitation is pos-
sible, the error rates of detection engines would become
unacceptably high. This means keystroke dynamics would
be unsuitable for use as a biometrics feature. The exist-
ing commercial security solutions using keystroke biomet-
rics [4, 1, 6, 5, 3, 2] can therefore be attacked.
The majority of literature in this area focused on finding
a detection algorithm that best separates the legitimate users
from imposters. The only work [18] which resembles ours
shows that (based on 21 participants) the provision of feed-
back shortens the distance between the attacker and victim’s
typing pattern by 9.7%. While differences can be reduced,
Rundhaug et al. suggested that an attack remains difficult
2Another important issue of biometrics security which is outside the
scope of this paper, is verifying if the authentication data came directly
from the owner. For example, in the case of fingerprint biometrics, if such
verification is absent, arbitrary fingerprints may be forged. Geller et al.
demonstrated how fingerprints can be forged in a forensic context [11].
Boatwright et al. cited an instance where gelatin created fingerprints were
used to gain unauthorized access [8]. Likewise, for keystroke biometrics,
if such verification is absent, an automated system may be used to deliver
the desired typing pattern to the detection engine.
3Scenarios where the typing pattern may be known includes (a) an at-
tacker captures samples of the victim’s password typing and (b) informa-
tion in the biometrics database was leaked.
and proposed larger scale experiments to verify the feasi-
bility of such attacks. In this paper, we demonstrate that
it is possible to imitate someone else’s keystroke typing if
appropriate feedback is provided.
We propose a novel feedback interface Mimesis with the
following design goals: (a) The information must be easy to
understand with minimal cognitive load required. The latter
is for the attackers to focus on their imitation task. (b) The
interface should provide specific tips on particular aspects to
improve on. (c) Both positive and negative feedback should
be provided to the attacker so that she can repeatedly make
minor adjustments to her typing pattern to imitate better.
We assembled a group of 84 participants to play the role
of attackers against one of the best keystroke biometrics
based authentication systems by Araujo et al. [7] (based on
the evaluation by Killourhy and Maxion [15]). We evaluate
the effectiveness of Mimesis and demonstrate that there ex-
ists individuals who can adjust their typing pattern to imitate
someone else. We demonstrate this attack using two sce-
narios (a) when the attacker only has an incomplete model
of the victim’s typing pattern, such as when only a limited
number of victim typing samples are available to infer the
model, and (b) when the attacker has complete information.
We show that even for attacks based on an incomplete
model, the average false acceptance rate increases from 0.24
to 0.63 for an easy password, and from 0.20 to 0.42 for a
harder password. For the best attackers, given a complete
model of the victim’s keystroke typing, we show that a false
acceptance rate of 0.99 can be achieved. Since our results
shows that even the best detector can be defeated by imita-
tion with Mimesis, we draw the conclusion that keystroke
biometrics is unsuitable as an authentication mechanism.
2. Background
In this section, we describe the commonly followed pro-
cedures in the evaluation of a keystroke biometrics authen-
tication system. We first provide an overview of keystroke
dynamics in Section 2.1 followed by the information that
is categorized for the anomaly detection methodology in
Section 2.2. We then describe the training process and the
calculation of the anomaly score in Section 2.3. Finally,
the computation of the threshold from the training and the
anomalous data set is shown in Section 2.4.
2.1. Choice of timing information
Keystroke dynamics refer to information about the typ-
ing pattern. For example, pressing and releasing of a
keystroke pair (ka, kb) results in 4 timings which are of in-
terest to keystroke biometrics systems: (a) key-down time
of ka: t↓ka , (b) key-up time of ka: t
↑
ka
, (c) key-down time of
kb: t
↓
kb
and (d) key-up time of kb: t↑kb
From these absolute time measurements, four relative
timings can be derived:
• an inter-keystroke timing between ka and kb:
Ika,kb = t
↓
kb
- t
↓
ka
.
• hold timing of ka: Hka = t↑ka - t
↓
ka
• hold timing of kb: Hkb = t↑kb - t
↓
kb
• a key up-down timing between ka and kb:
Uka,kb = t
↓
kb
- t
↑
ka
Different anomaly detectors used in keystroke biomet-
rics used different combinations of I, H and U such as I,
H and U [7], only I [13, 7], only H [7], only U [7], I and
H [7], H and U [9, 7], I and U [7].
2.2. Data vectorization
In the context of this paper, we are interested in the tim-
ing information collected for each password in a keystroke
biometric based authentication system. These timing infor-
mation are typically stored in vectors. However, prior re-
search differs in the layout of the vectors. In this paper, as
in the case for Araujo et al. [7], we store in each collected
vector the timing information of each password, resulting in
n vectors of length 2l − 1 (because we collect l − 1 inter-
keystroke times and l hold times). For brevity, the remain-
der of this section assumes the case where only the I and H
timing components are collected (see Table 1).
Sample Inter-Keystroke Time Hold Time
# 1 I1k1,k2 . . . I
1
kl−1,kl
H1k1 . . . H
1
kl
# 2 I2k1,k2 . . . I
2
kl−1,kl
H2k1 . . . H
2
kl
.
.
.
.
.
.
# n Ink1,k2 . . . I
n
kl−1,kl
Hnk1 . . . H
n
kl
Table 1. Example of data vectorization
For a password, e.g. ‘serndele’, each timing information
vector z can be represented as
z =
‘serndele’︷ ︸︸ ︷
Is,e, . . . , Il,e︸ ︷︷ ︸
inter-keystroke time
, Hs, . . . , He︸ ︷︷ ︸
hold time
The collected vectors are typically divided into 4 sets
when evaluating a keystroke biometrics system. For each
user of the system, 1 set of normal timing vectors from that
user and 1 set of anomalous timing vectors is used for train-
ing. 1 additional set each of normal and anomalous tim-
ing vectors are used for testing. In an experimental setting,
the anomalous timing vectors for each user is typically con-
structed from the normal timing vectors of all other users in
the same authentication system.
2.3. Anomaly detector training and scoring
Once the training data set is collected, the next step is to
train the anomaly detector. The purpose of training is to find
parameters for the detector corresponding to the particular
set of training data. Detectors differ in the choice of param-
eters. For example, in the papers of Joyce et al. and Cho et
al. [13, 9] only the mean vector is needed, whereas Araujo
et al. requires both a mean vector and an absolute deviation
vector [7]. Once the parameters are determined, a detector
can compute an anomaly score for each test vector.
Computation of mean vector The mean vector, denoted
by x¯ is computed from:
x¯ =


n∑
i=1
Iik1,k2
n
, . . . ,
n∑
i=1
Iikl−1,kl
n
,
n∑
i=1
Hik1
n
, . . . ,
n∑
i=1
Hikl
n


=(x¯1, x¯2, . . . , x¯2l−1)
Computation of absolute deviation vector The absolute
deviation d can be computed from:
d =


n∑
i=1
|Iik1,k2 − x¯1|
n− 1
, . . . ,
n∑
i=1
|Iikl−1,kl − x¯l−1|
n− 1
,
n∑
i=1
|Hik1 − x¯l|
n− 1
, . . . ,
n∑
i=1
|Hikl − x¯2l−1|
n− 1


=(d1, . . . , d2l−1)
Euclidean distance based anomaly score After the pa-
rameters of the detector are computed, the anomaly score
for any given test vector can be computed by applying
the detection algorithm. Denoting the test vector as ts =
(ts1, ts2, . . . , ts2l−1), we calculate the Euclidean distance
based anomaly score ae of ts using,
ae =
√√√√2l−1∑
j=1
(tsj − x¯j)2
Note that the calculation of Euclidean distance requires
only the mean vector of the victim but not the absolute de-
viation vector.
Manhattan distance based anomaly score Unlike the
Euclidean distance, the Manhattan (scaled) distance re-
quires both the mean and absolute deviation vector. This
anomaly score as is computed using,
as =
2l−1∑
j=1
|tsj − x¯j |
dj
2.4. Computation of threshold
Anomaly detectors take a test vector as input and out-
put a single bit of information classifying the input vector
as either normal or anomalous. An anomaly score by itself
is therefore insufficient. A threshold, or decision criteria is
also needed, such that the anomaly score can be mapped to
a normal/anomalous range. Setting a strict threshold means
that less anomalous vectors are wrongly classified as nor-
mal. The percentage of such vectors is known as the false
acceptance rate (FAR). A strict threshold, however, also
means that more normal vectors are wrongly classified as
anomalous. The percentage of such vectors is known as
the false rejection rate (FRR). A lenient threshold on the
other hand has the opposite effect: FAR increases (worse)
but FRR decreases (better).
For both the Euclidean detector and Manhattan (scaled)
detector, if the anomaly score is higher than the threshold,
the test vector tsj is classified as anomalous. Conversely,
if the anomaly score is lower than the threshold, tsj is
classified as normal. In the context of keystroke biometric
based authentication, submission of a tsj that is classified as
anomalous means that the authentication attempt is rejected
and similarly, if tsj is classified as normal then the authen-
tication attempt is accepted. The selection of the thresh-
old therefore involves a tradeoff between FAR and FRR. A
common way to set the threshold is to chose it such that the
FAR and FRR are equal. The value of the FAR (or FRR)
at such a threshold is known as the equal error rate (EER).
Once the threshold is computed, an anomaly detector be-
comes ready for the classification task. Typically, a set of
test vectors containing both normal and anomalous vector
are used to evaluate the effectiveness of the detector.
3. Experimental design considerations
This paper questions whether it is possible for one per-
son to imitate another’s typing pattern. Our approach is to
provide feedback, such that the imitator can incrementally
adjust her typing pattern to be closer to her target’s. We also
want to investigate the factors affecting the effectiveness of
imitation. In this section, we explain our experimental de-
sign considerations.
3.1. Choice of detector and its features
We chose the Manhattan (scaled) anomaly detector by
Araujo et al. [7] (the best out of 14 anomaly detectors
evaluated by Killourhy and Maxion [15]). In Section 2.3,
we have provided a brief description of its computation
of anomaly score. Araujo et al. conducted 7 experiments
based on different combinations of inter-keystroke timing,
hold timing and key down-up timing. The inter-keystroke
timing and hold timing are always positive. Key down-up
timing refers to the time between releasing the previous key
and pressing the next key. It is possible that the next key
is pressed before the previous key is released, therefore,
the key down-up timing can sometimes be negative. Al-
though only 2 timings are independent4, the best performing
combination used all three timings (choice VII [7]). In our
study however, we chose to use a combination of only inter-
keystroke timing and hold timing (choice V [7]), which had
a FAR and FRR of 5.59% and 1.27% respectively, com-
pared to 1.89% and 1.45% for choice VII [7].
Our reasons for excluding U are: firstly, including U in-
creases the amount of feedback information to show in the
feedback interface by about 50%. Our concern is that this
may overwhelm the participants. Secondly, I and H tim-
ings are rather intuitive and participants should have little
issue understanding it. U on the other hand is less intuitive
and can even be negative. By excluding it, we avoid the
possibility of under-performance due to poor understanding
of this parameter.
3.2. Attack scenarios
As a prerequisite for imitation, an attacker must know
the typing pattern of her victim. When designing the ex-
periments, we considered 2 possible scenarios whereby the
typing pattern may be obtained. In the first scenario, the
attacker is able to extract the victim pattern from a com-
promised biometrics database. From the attacker’s point of
view, this is the optimum scenario, because it allows her
to build an exact replica of the detector with the victim’s
parameters for her training needs. In the second scenario,
the attacker may be able to capture samples of the victim’s
keystrokes as she is authenticating (e.g. by installing a key-
logger). If the attacker is able to capture a large number of
samples, she would be able to get a good approximation of
the victim parameters.
A question however arises when the attacker is only able
to capture a relatively small number of samples. For our
chosen detector, there are 2 parameters which are important
to the attacker: the mean vector and the absolute deviation
vector. It is possible that only one such parameter can be
estimated with a small number of samples. An investiga-
tion into imitation effectiveness should therefore include an
analysis of the extent to which both vectors can be approx-
4The inter-keystroke timing, hold timing and key up-down timing are
related: Ika,kb = Hka,kb + Uka,kb . Hence, any one of the three can be
calculated if the other 2 are known.
imated. If only one vector can be approximated, it is use-
ful to measure the imitation effectiveness under such a sce-
nario. We refer to this as the partial information scenario.
3.3. Motivating the participants
We consider motivation as a key factor that decides the
outcome of our experiments. For that, we gave special con-
siderations in three aspects. Firstly, the feedback interface
must be designed to sustain the participant’s interest. Sec-
ondly, good imitators should be rewarded for their extra ef-
forts in the form of a performance bonus. Lastly, the dura-
tion of the experiments must strike a balance between (1)
pushing the participants to try hard enough and (2) not set-
ting it so long that it bores the participants.
Given that there will be multiple experiments, we de-
cided that the first imitation experiment should have a fixed
duration of about 30-45 minutes. For subsequent experi-
ments, we assumed that we can identify and select those
with high motivation. For these participants, the experi-
ment is designed to be target based. That is, they will be
given targets and associated rewards. There is no duration
constraint: they can leave anytime or ask for more time.
3.4. Basis for comparison of results
In each experiment, we need to determine how much
each attacker has improved and more importantly, their
chance of success for the next try if they are sent to attack
a system in an actual scenario. If we used all the data in
each experiment to determine the improvement, there will
be a problem of underestimation in 2 aspects. Firstly, each
attacker is likely to spend a good part of her time exploring
and fine tuning her keystrokes. The data during this period
reflects the trials and errors of each attacker’s learning pro-
cess, but not the outcome of the learning. Secondly, for the
fixed duration experiments, boredom may set in after some
point. The participant may be just “clocking” their time
without trying hard.
We therefore decide that for all experiments, feedback
shall include a history of their last 20 tries. Comparison of
results across different experiments is also be based on the
same set of data. We name the best 20 consecutive tries of
each experiment the b20 data set. Our justification for the
choice of 20 is that if an attacker achieves a certain target for
20 tries, even if she has only a 50% chance of repeating the
feat for the next 20 tries, the probability of success for the
next try is given by 20
√
0.5 = 0.97. It means that an attacker
who has been trained before based on the b20 targets has a
significant chance of success in a real life scenario.
3.5. Choice of password
One common problem with password based authentica-
tion systems is the prevalence of weak passwords. For ex-
ample, ‘password’ is the top password choice. Peacock et
al. considered keystroke dynamics as an effective low cost
countermeasure [17]. The argument is that even if attack-
ers guess the weak password, they cannot imitate the typing
pattern. However, weak password tend to be easy to type. If
attackers can imitate better as the password weakens, then
the effectiveness of keystroke biometrics in mitigating weak
passwords is lesser than previously assumed.
For this reason, we decide to have 2 groups of partic-
ipants. One group practises based on an easy password
chosen to minimize finger movements on a standard US
keyboard. The other group practices based on a relatively
harder password chosen to maximize finger movements and
therefore difficulty of typing. We also added a criteria that it
must contain mixed case alphabets, at least 1 number and at
least 1 punctuation to ensure compliance with the require-
ments of a strong password. We chose the weak and strong
password as ‘serndele’ and ‘ths.ouR2’ respectively. Hav-
ing two groups allows us to evaluate the effect of password
typing difficulty on imitation.
4. Experimental setup
In this section, we describe our experimental setup5
given the considerations in Section 3. We divide our in-
vestigation into 4 experiments, e1, e2, e3a and e3b. In e1,
we collect the keystroke dynamics for each participant; e2
and e3a involves imitation training with only the mean vec-
tor given (the latter is a repeat of the former, but with one
week interval in between); and e3b studies the effectiveness
of using Manhattan (scaled) distance as the feedback. Fig-
ure 1 shows the experimental structure and demographics.
Timing information was collected using Javascript, by
monitoring key-down and key-up events. Although Java-
script timing measurements have a granularity of millisec-
ond (via the Date object), the actual timing granularity is af-
fected by the operating system. For example, Windows XP
based machines have a scheduling tick quantum of approxi-
mately 16 ms. This implies that the Javascript events which
we are monitoring occur at the timing of the quantum. The
timings collected on such machines therefore are in mul-
tiples of approximately 16 ms. In comparison, the timing
granularity of keystroke events in the literature varies from
0.2ms [15], 1ms [7] and 10ms [20, 12]. In all the experi-
5The experiments conducted were approved by the Institutional Re-
view Board of the Singapore Management University (IRB approval ref-
erence IRB-12-0031-A0039). Data collected from the participants were
anonymized and protected according to the procedures described in the
corresponding IRB submission documents.
Figure 1. Experimental structure and demo-
graphics
ments, mistyped samples were discarded. All participants
were paid $8 for each experiment they completed.
4.1. Exp e1: Training Data Collection
e1 is designed based on the enrolment phase of existing
keystroke dynamics based authentication systems, where
each user is required to submit a certain number of samples
to train the anomaly detector. Figure 2 shows the interface
used. 88 participants took part in this experiment. This part
of the study was conducted online and the participants were
asked to type in the password (provided by us) in an input
box via our web interface. Each participant is required to
type the same password 200 times without taking any break.
Figure 2. User interface for e1
4.2. Exp e2: Imitation using Euclidean distance
In Section 3.2, we mentioned the need to analyst the ex-
tent to which the mean and absolute deviations vectors can
be approximated by relatively few samples as well as mea-
suring the imitation effectiveness in such a case. Based
on a preliminary analysis, we found that the mean can be
estimated more accurately than the absolute deviation (see
Section 6.1 for the justification). We designed e2 to inves-
tigate the imitation effectiveness when only the mean vec-
tor is known to the attacker. Without the absolute devia-
tion vector, the actual anomaly score for each vector can-
not be calculated. The feedback therefore can only provide
an approximation. We chose the Euclidean distance based
anomaly score (described in Section 2.3) for this purpose.
e2 was conducted 1 week after e1. The choice of 1 week
was made so that (a) participants have enough time to rest
after e1 and (b) we have enough time to compute the param-
eters of the anomaly detectors needed for the experiment.
84 participants played the role of attackers. Ten victims
were chosen randomly from among the participants of e1.
Each attacker in e2 is randomly assigned a victim from the
set of 10 to imitate his/her typing .
Two constraints apply to the assignment: (a) the attacker
and the victim cannot be the same person, (b) the attacker
and victim were assigned the same password in e1. Each
attacker was given an approximate anomaly score feedback
based on the Euclidean distance and required to spend at
least 30 minutes. An additional 15 minutes were provided
if requested. No performance bonus was offered, but the
attackers were told that only the best few will be chosen
for e3a and e3b (for which they will be paid up to $28).
The feedback interface is more elaborated compared to e1
and is described in Section 5. At the end of e2, participants
answered a questionnaire on the imitation experience.
Computation of the threshold for each victim requires a
set of anomalous data in addition to the normal data. Fol-
lowing the same procedure as Killourhy and Maxion [15],
we build the anomalous data for each victim using the first
5 samples of the passwords typed from all other participants
in the same category.
To help evaluate the effects of different input devices
on the imitation outcome, some participants were asked to
type directly on their own notebook keyboard. Others were
asked to use an external keyboard provided by us.
4.3. Exp e3a: Additional imitation session with Eu-
clidean distance
e3a is the second imitation experiment conducted and is
very similar to e2. It was conducted 1 week after e2 to allow
time for the attackers to rest and reflect, as well as for the
researchers to process the data and pick the best attackers.
14 participants were chosen from the attackers of e2 using
a subjective gauge of the interest level and aptitude based
on (a) the enthusiasm observed during e2, (b) the number
of samples submitted, (c) their response to our queries if
they would like a second session with more time and (d) the
improvement profile (see Figure 5).
The set of attacker-victim assignment, the anomaly score
calculation (Euclidean distance) and the feedback interface
remains unchanged. Each attacker is required to spend 20
minutes. As in e2, no performance bonus was offered. The
purpose of this session is to investigate the effect an addi-
tional session has on the imitation outcome.
4.4. Exp e3b: Imitation using Manhattan distance
The goal of this part of the experiment is to analyze the
effectiveness of keystroke imitation if an attacker is highly
motivated and can obtain the full set of victim’s typing pat-
tern parameters. e3b is the final imitation experiment. It
was conducted after a break of 15 minutes from e3a, so as
to allow the attackers rest and refreshments.
In e3b, the interface was changed to (a) compute the
anomaly score based on the Manhattan (scaled) distance,
and (b) include information about the absolute deviation
vector (see Section 5). Two performance bonuses of equal
to and double the base payment rate were offered. The first
bonus is given if they can produce a consecutive run of 20
vectors all of which are scored better than their best average
score in e2. The second bonus increases this difficulty by
10%. The attackers are also offered additional time up to 2
hours. All other experimental settings including the set of
attackers and their demographics remain unchanged from
e3a.
5. Mimesis
Mimesis is the feedback interface for our imitation ex-
periments. We provide the design goals of Mimesis in Sec-
tion 1. The design of the feedback is important because the
quality of the feedback directly affects the outcome of our
imitation experiments. Inadequate or inappropriate feed-
back may hamper the performance of the attacker. Figure 3
shows the Mimesis interface for the scenario where only
partial information of the victim is available. We denote
this interface as Mpart. The interface for the full informa-
tion scenario (denoted Mfull) is similar. Mimesis consists
of 5 components.
Top-left section This contains the password which the at-
tacker a is trying to imitate and an input box to type in. a
can also break up the password into segments and practice
on each segment separately. Two buttons here provides par-
ticipants with the option to hide both the tables in the center
section and/or the graphical form of feedback in the bottom
section.
Top-center section This contains the attack score (com-
puted from the anomaly score using negative linear scaling
and then translated to fit within 0 and 100) for a’s last sub-
mitted password. It also shows the average of the recent
20 scores. For Mpart, the scores are derived from the Eu-
clidean distance. For Mfull, the scores are calculated from
the Manhattan (scaled) distance. The scores are only up-
dated when the attacker presses the enter key and only af-
ter typing the correct password. For practice sessions with
password segments, no score is computed.
Figure 3. Mimesis interface with Euclidean distance
Top-right section This contains a graphical plot of the at-
tack scores for the recent 20 correctly typed passwords. Our
basis of comparison considers the best 20 consecutive vec-
tors (see Section 3.4). This section therefore allows each
attacker to easily grasp her past performance.
Center section This section contains two tables corre-
sponding to the hold timing H and inter-keystroke timing I
respectively. The tables provides numerical feedback on the
victim’s mean vector and the last submitted attacker vector.
For Mfull, a weight w computed from the corresponding
victim’s absolute deviation is also shown so that attackers
know the relative importance of each key in calculating the
attack score. To help the attackers make their adjustments,
we also provide positive and negative feedback in the form
of a penalty (the last row of each table) to the score. Penalty
is computed based on victim’s and attacker’s typing. The
timing components accounting for the largest differences
are highlighted in red as negative feedback. Components
that are similar between attacker and victim are highlighted
in a different color as a positive feedback.
Bottom section This contains a graphical form of the in-
formation shown in the two tables. Circles represent Hka
and vertical bars between the circles represent Ika,kb . The
larger/smaller the circle is, the longer/shorter Hka is, re-
spectively. (Circles are chosen for the similarity with finger
marks left on glass surfaces; the harder one presses, the big-
ger the mark.) Similarly, the taller/shorter the vertical bar
is, the longer/shorter Ika,kb is, respectively. As is the case
for numerical feedback, both positive and negative feedback
are provided, using different color code. Red color is used
as negative feedback when the differences in component
timings are large. An additional alert is placed above the
component with the most critical difference. Green is used
as positive feedback to indicate similarity between attacker
and victim’s timing components. In the case of Mfull, a
weight w (computed from the victim’s absolute deviation
vector) is added to the feedback as shown in Figure 4. w
shows the relative importance of each component in calcu-
lating the attack score.
Figure 4. Mimesis interface (bottom section)
based on Manhattan (scaled) distance
6. Evaluation
In this section, we present the results from our experi-
ments. We start with the typing profile of a participant play-
ing the role of an attacker as she progressed through each
of the 4 experiments. Figure 5 shows the anomaly scores
for both Euclidean and Manhattan (scaled) distances aga-
inst a running index of her submitted timing vectors. Ver-
tical lines separate the vectors in each experiment; gaps in
the running indices are added around each separator line
for clarity; horizontal line is the equal error rate threshold
of the victim; anomaly scores below the horizontal line are
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(a) Euclidean distance based anomaly score. The last section is omitted
as the attacker is no longer practising against the Euclidean distance in
e3b.
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(b) Manhattan (scaled) distance based anomaly score
Figure 5. The anomaly scores of an attacker
across all four experiments.
(falsely) accepted by the authentication system.
In e1, the attacker is required to type the assigned pass-
word 200 times. The Euclidean distance between each tim-
ing vector collected during this experiment and the victim’s
mean vector is plotted in the first section of Figure 5(a).
Similarly, the Manhattan (scaled) distance is plotted in the
first section of Figure 5(b). The data collected in e1 serves
as a baseline because it is what an attacker can achieve with-
out any imitation effort. Although we collected 200 vectors
for each participant in this experiment, some vectors were
discarded6 and are not shown.
In e2, the attacker is provided with Euclidean distance
based feedback using the Mpart interface. We can observe
that the attacker took only less than 100 tries to achieve her
best results for this experiment. Note that the improvement
is more obvious in the Euclidean distance as compared to
the Manhattan (scaled) distance.
In e3a, the attacker was given 20 minutes to repeat e2.
After a one week of time along with the prior experience of
e2 (learning effect), we can observe that the attacker pro-
duced a noticeable improvement in her Euclidean distance
based anomaly scores. The corresponding improvement in
Manhattan (scaled) distance is less pronounced. This is
due to the weak correlation between Euclidean distance and
Manhattan (scaled) distance. The coefficient of correlation
6Only e1 was conducted online. After it was concluded, we found that
certain submitted vectors has near zero hold timing and inter-keystroke
timing between the first and second characters because of network error.
We filtered all such vectors from e1. The remaining experiments were all
conducted in our lab and did not have the same issue.
between Euclidean and Manhattan (scaled) distance for all
vectors collected in e1, e2 and e3a is 0.543.
In e3b, the attacker was given (a) feedback based on
the Manhattan (scaled) distance, (b) a performance bonus
to improve on her previous results and (c) additional time
of up to 2 hours. These conditions simulate a motivated
attacker operating under optimum conditions. We can see
from Figure 5(b) a noticeable improvement towards the end
of the experiment.
In the remainder of this section, we present the rest of
our experimental findings. In Section 6.1 we investigate the
possibility of collision attacks in e1 where the attackers are
not provided with any form of feedback. We also evaluate
the quality of detector parameter estimation with few sam-
ples. In Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 we present the outcome of
e2, e3a and e3b experiments respectively.
6.1. Interesting results from e1
In this experiment, we obtained the timing vectors from
84 attackers who were asked to type their corresponding
victim’s password 200 times without any feedback. The
victim assignment was random. 37 attackers typed the sim-
pler password ‘serndele’, while the remainder typed the
harder password ‘ths.ouR2’. From the submitted timing
vectors, we evaluate (a) the likelihood of collision attacks
and (b) the extent to which anomaly detector parameters
can be estimated when few samples are available. The lat-
ter results provide the justification for the partial informa-
tion scenario described in Section 3.2.
6.1.1 Collision attack
In Killourhy and Maxion’s evaluation [15], the anomalous
timing vectors of each user was constructed from the first 5
vectors submitted by all other users. This simulated attack-
ers who are unfamiliar with typing their victim’s password.
They raised but did not answer the question of whether the
FAR would change if attackers are allowed to practise typ-
ing the password. In e1 we attempt to answer this question.
We compute the overall FAR based on all vectors submitted
by each attacker (instead of just the first 5).
Figure 6 shows the overall FAR in e1. Most attackers
have an overall FAR of 0.2 or less. However, there exists
1 attacker (the last bar) with an overall FAR of more than
0.8. This implies that even without any imitation training,
she has at least an 80% chance of pretending to be the vic-
tim successfully. This is an example of a collision attack.
In practice, given a target organization with 10 high value
targets, if a team of 84 attackers were to be assembled, we
expect to find on average, one attacker with the same typing
pattern as one of the high value targets.
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Figure 6. Overall FAR in e1
6.1.2 Estimation of anomaly detector parameters from
few samples
We conducted a Monte Carlo simulation based on the tim-
ing vectors collected in e1. For each participant in e1, 10
samples were randomly picked from the collected data and
the mean and absolute deviation were estimated based on
these 10 samples. This is compared against the actual mean
and absolute deviation computed using all available sam-
ples. We repeat this process 10,000 times for each partic-
ipant. It was found that on average, the estimated mean is
within ±10% of the actual mean 74% of the time. On the
other hand, the estimated absolute deviation is only close to
the actual absolute deviation 21% of the time. This shows
that the scenario where an attacker can infer only the mean
vector but not the absolute deviation vector is plausible.
This provides the justification for the partial information
scenario of e2 and e3a.
6.2. Imitation outcome of e2
In e2, each attacker is provided feedback based on the
Euclidean distance assuming the partial information sce-
nario of Section 3.2. 84 participants participated in this ex-
periment. We present the change in FAR (see Section 6.2.1),
followed by an analysis of how this change was affected by
(a) choice of keyboard (see Section 6.2.2), (b) password dif-
ficulty (see Section 6.2.3), (c) attacker typing consistency
(see Section 6.2.4). We also analyzed the optimum duration
per training session in Section 6.2.5.
6.2.1 Improvement in FAR after imitation training
Figure 7 shows the FAR improvement in e2 as compared to
e1. More than two-third of the attackers (56) improved their
FAR from e1. However, there were some attackers (12) with
no improvement in the FAR, while a small proportion (16)
degraded. The last point demonstrates the shortcoming of
using the Euclidean distance to approximate the Manhattan
(scaled) distance in the partial information scenario. Intu-
itively, if the attacker decreases her differences in one com-
ponent of her vector, but increases in another, whether the
corresponding Manhattan (scaled) distance increases or de-
creases depends on the scaling ratio of the two components,
which is not known to the attacker. The partial information
scenario is plausible, but not ideal.
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6.2.2 Effect of keyboards
Prior to the experiments, we speculated that external key-
boards, compared to notebook keyboards, facilitate the im-
itation. Feedback from attackers also supports this conjec-
ture. To investigate this, in e2, 40 participants out of 84
participants used an external keyboard provided by us. The
remainder used their own notebook keyboard. To verify our
conjecture, we used a 2-sample Student’s t test assuming
unequal variance. The null hypothesis states that there are
no differences between the mean of the b20 FAR for attack-
ers using external keyboards, compared to those not using
one. We use a two-tailed test as there are no conclusive evi-
dence to support the use of a one-tailed test. The results are
shown in Table 2. While there are differences, the p value of
0.227 is not significant enough to conclude that an external
keyboard made any difference.
Groups Mean Variance t Stat P(T≤t) t Critical
Own 0.564 0.146 1.217 0.227 1.989External 0.462 0.148
Table 2. Effect of keyboards
6.2.3 Effect of password difficulty
Figures 8(a) and 8(b) shows the change in overall FAR in
e2 for different passwords. In e1, only 1 attacker practising
on the easier password had a similar typing pattern as her
victim (0.8 ≤ FAR ≤ 1). The training in e2 increased the
number of such attackers to 6. For the harder password, no
attacker is similar to her victim in e1. After e2, there were
2 such attackers. Statistical analysis using a 2-sample t-test
with unequal variance showed that for the harder password,
the change is not statistically significant (see Table 3(b)).
In contrast, the change is highly significant for the easier
password (see Table 3(a)).
In Section 3.4, we explained why using the overall FAR
underestimates the effects of imitation. Therefore, we also
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(d) ‘ths.ouR2’ - Using best consecutive 20 samples
Figure 8. Improvement in FAR in e2 from e1
Groups Mean Variance t Stat P(T≤t) t Critical
e1 overall 0.241 0.065
-3.586 < 0.001 1.993
e2 overall 0.471 0.085
(a) ‘serndele’
Groups Mean Variance t Stat P(T≤t) t Critical
e1 overall 0.196 0.050
-1.769 0.081 1.987
e2 overall 0.288 0.075
(b) ‘ths.ouR2’
Table 3. t-test on overall FAR in e1 and overall
FAR in e2
evaluate the change in b20 FAR. These are plotted in Fig-
ure 8(c) and 8(d) respectively. As expected, the number of
attackers similar to their victims show a marked increase to
22 and 11 (as opposed to 1 and 0) for the easier and harder
passwords respectively. This suggests that even imitation
with partial information (based on Mpart interface) helps
the attacker in her performance significantly.
Statistical analysis using a 2-sample t-test with unequal
variance showed that for both passwords, the change is
highly significant (see Tables 4(a)and 4(b)). The differences
in mean between the easier and the harder password suggest
that passwords that are easier to type are also easier to im-
itate. The implications raised by Section 3.5 is therefore
confirmed: the effectiveness of keystroke biometrics in mit-
igating weak passwords is lesser than previously assumed.
6.2.4 Effect of attacker consistency
Intuitively, if an attacker is more consistent she should be
able to exercise better control over her keystrokes, which
should lead to better imitation outcome. To investigate the
validity of this conjecture, we define a measure of consis-
Groups Mean Variance t Stat P(T≤t) t Critical
e1 overall 0.241 0.065
-5.126 < 0.001 1.998
e2 b20 0.633 0.150
(a) ‘serndele’
Groups Mean Variance t Stat P(T≤t) t Critical
e1 overall 0.196 0.050
-3.678 < 0.001 1.991
e2 b20 0.425 0.131
(b) ‘ths.ouR2’
Table 4. t-test on overall FAR in e1 and b20 FAR
in e2
tency c. Referring to the vector notation of table 1, the
standard deviation vector7 (s) can be computed using the
following
s =


n∑
i=1
√
(Ii
k1,k2
)2 − (x¯1)2
n− 1
, . . . ,
n∑
i=1
√
(Ii
kl−1,kl
)2 − (x¯l−1)2
n− 1
,
n∑
i=1
√
(Hi
k1
)2 − (x¯l)2
n− 1
, . . . ,
n∑
i=1
√
(Hi
kl
)2 − (x¯2l−1)2
n− 1


=(s1, . . . , s2l−1)
For each component of s, the larger its value, the larger
the variability and therefore the lesser the consistency score.
The consistency score c for each participant is defined as the
7Note the difference between the standard deviation vector s vs the
absolute deviation vector d of the scaled manhattan detector.
inverse of the average deviation in s:
c =
2l− 1
2l−1∑
j=1
sj


The relation between imitation outcome and consistency
is shown in Figure 9 which plots the b20 FAR against at-
tacker consistency. Each point in the plot corresponds to
one attacker. We can observe that there is no correlation be-
tween the imitation outcome (b20) of e2 against attacker’s
consistency score for both the easy password and the harder
password. The coefficient of correlation for the easy pass-
word is 0.11 and for the harder password is -0.09. There-
fore, there is no evidence to support our intuition that con-
sistent attackers imitate better.
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Figure 9. Imitation performance based on
consistency in e1
A related and perhaps more interesting question is
whether imitation training also improves attacker consis-
tency. Figure 10 compares the consistency score of each at-
tacker in e1 and e2. The attackers who are on the left of the
vertical line were assigned the harder password ‘ths.ouR2’.
Those on the right were assigned the easier password ‘sern-
dele’. The attackers are sorted in a descending order ac-
cording to their consistency score in e1.
Visual inspection of Figure 10 showed (a) there is no
correlation between the c in e1 and e2, and (b) imitation
training also improves the attacker’s typing consistency re-
gardless of the password complexity. (a) is confirmed by
the coefficient of correlation, which has a near-zero value
of 0.088. To verify (b), we used a 2-sample t-test with un-
equal variance. The results are shown in Table 5. The p
value is less than 0.001 and confirms that the difference in
consistency score c between e1 and e2 is highly significant.
Groups Mean Variance t Stat P(T≤t) t Critical
e1 0.016 2.880E-05
-9.158 < 0.001 1.975
e2 0.025 5.005E-05
Table 5. t-test on c in e1 and e2
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0 20 40 60 80
C
o
n
sis
te
n
cy
 
sc
o
re
 
(c)
Participant
e1
e2
Figure 10. Consistency scores (c) in e1 and e2
6.2.5 Optimum duration per training session
In Figure 11, we show the time required for the attackers
to reach their b20 performance in e2. 47 out of 84 (56%)
attackers took less than 20 minutes. However, we also saw
in Figure 5 that there is further room for improvement when
given a second session. This suggests that instead of a sin-
gle long session, imitation may be more effective when con-
ducted in multiple sessions of shorter duration. A full inves-
tigation into the outcome for various combinations of ses-
sion duration and number of sessions is however out of the
scope of this paper and we leave it for future work.
0
10
20
30
40
0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
Time
Figure 11. Time required in e2
6.3. Imitation outcome of e3a
After e2, the 14 best attackers (based on their imitation
performance and consistency score) were selected and given
a week’s rest. They were then recalled for a repeat of e2.
Based on the findings in e2 we limit the duration of e3a to
20 mins. The question we want to investigate in this section
is that under the partial information scenario, do attackers
reach their peak performance within the first 30 minutes or
they are capable of further improvements when given more
time to rest, reflect and repeat their earlier efforts.
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Figure 12. b20 FAR in e2 and e3a
Figure 12 shows the improvement in the b20 FAR be-
tween e2 and e3a. We found that there is no significant dif-
ference between b20 FAR obtained in e2 and e3a (see Ta-
ble 6). Out of the 14 attackers, 6 improved their b20 FAR,
4 were unchanged while 4 actually worsened.
Groups Mean Variance t Stat P(T≤t) t Critical
e2 0.771 0.073
-0.770 0.448 2.059
e3a 0.842 0.046
Table 6. t-test on b20 FAR in e2 and e3a
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(b) Manhattan (scaled) distance based anomaly score
Figure 13. The anomaly scores of the worst
performing attacker of e3a
To explain the anomaly where the performance of some
participants actually degraded, we examine the profile of
one such attacker with the worst e3a FAR (participant no. 3
in Figure 12). Figure 13 shows the typing profile of this par-
ticipant where the anomaly scores are plotted against a run-
ning index of each timing vector. We can observe that the
Euclidean score of this attacker actually improves in e3a.
However, the improvement in Euclidean score did not trans-
late into a marked improvement in Manhattan (scaled) score
for this attacker. The reason is due to the weak correlation
between these two distances.
6.4. Imitation outcome of e3b
Experiment e3b was conducted following e3a after a
break of 15 minutes. This experiment simulates highly mo-
tivated attackers operating under optimum conditions (full
victim information, performance bonus and more time).
The attackers were told to try to achieve the 2 targets (see
Section 4.4 for details). Out of the 14 attackers, 2 managed
to achieve the lesser bonus and another 3 achieved the full
bonus. (Note that qualifying for the bonus is more difficult
than crossing their victim’s acceptance threshold.) We can
observe from Figure 14 that almost all attackers were able
to achieve near perfect imitation of their victims. The re-
sults of a 2-sample t-test with unequal variance is shown in
Table 7. The p value of 0.022 confirms that the difference
in the FAR for e3a and e3b is statistically significant.
Groups Mean Variance t Stat P(T≤t) t Critical
e3a 0.842 0.046
-2.594 0.022 2.160
e3b 0.992 3.29E-04
Table 7. t-test on b20 FAR in e3a and e3b
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Figure 14. b20 FAR in e3a and e3b for partici-
pants of all four experiments
Figure 15 shows for one victim, her original FRR from
e1, original FAR from e1 and the FAR of her 2 assigned
attackers (a1 and a2) from e3b. During the training phase,
the threshold is set at a Manhattan (scaled) distance of 1.2,
resulting in an EER of 0.2 for the detector. Imitation train-
ing markedly increases the FAR curve for both attackers. If
the threshold remains unchanged, FAR increases to 1. This
means the detector is unable to differentiate between the at-
tackers and this victim. If the threshold is recalibrated to a
distance of 0.75, it results in an unacceptable EER of 0.7.
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Figure 15. Effect of imitation training on the
FRR and FARs
The amount of time taken by each attacker in e3b to
reach their b20 performance is shown in Figure 16. For
9 out of 14 (64%) attackers, their performance peaked in 20
minutes or less. This is consistent with our observations in
Section 6.2. Two highly motivated participants took nearly
2 hours. One of them achieved both performance bonuses
at the end.
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Figure 16. Time required in e3b
7. Discussion
In this section, we discuss the various factors affect-
ing the outcome of the imitation, such as gender (see Sec-
tion 7.1.1), typing speed (see Section 7.1.2), imitation strat-
egy (see Section 7.1.3) and similarities in typing patterns
(see Section 7.1.4). In Section 7.2, we discuss the attack-
ers’ interface preferences. Their perception towards the
difficulty of hold timings or inter-keystroke timings is dis-
cussed in Section 7.3. Finally, we state the limitations in
Section 7.4.
7.1. Factors affecting imitation outcome
Various hypotheses were put forward by both researchers
and participants in the course of our experiments to account
for the differences in imitation outcome. We evaluate each
of them in the following discussions.
7.1.1 Gender
In the experiment e2, our participants pool consists of 39
males and 45 females. In Figure 17, we show the aver-
age e2 b20 FAR for both genders across the two passwords
used. We can observe that male attackers achieved an aver-
age FAR of 0.51 and 0.81 for the harder and easier password
respectively, compared to 0.33 and 0.51 for the female at-
tackers. Male participants therefore perform significantly
better than females in the imitation experiments. Further-
more, for both genders, the easier password to type is also
the easier password to imitate, although the difference is
more pronounced in males.
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Figure 17. FAR based on gender
We confirm the differences using a 2-sample t-test as-
suming unequal variance. The null hypothesis states that
Groups Mean Variance t Stat P(T≤t) t Critical
Female 0.420 0.133
-2.548 0.006 1.664Male 0.629 0.149
Table 8. t-test on b20 FAR in e2 on gender
there are no differences between the mean of the b20 FAR
between male and female attackers. The results are summa-
rized in Table 8, which shows that the null hypothesis can
be rejected. Since the p value is less than 1%, the test is
highly significant.
7.1.2 Typing speed
During the experiment, feedback from certain attackers in-
dicated that they believed slower victims are easier to imi-
tate. To evaluate this, a measure of their typing latency is
required. For each attacker and victim, we compute the av-
erage timing of all components in each participant’s mean
vector x¯ as a measure of their latency:
v =
2l−1∑
j=1
x¯j
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Figure 18. Typing latency of each victim and
their attackers
Figure 18 shows the latency profile of all 10 chosen vic-
tims using the typing keystrokes from e1. Each victim was
assigned 8 to 9 attackers. The attackers’ latencies are shown
on the same plot as vertical lines. The midpoint of each line
indicates the mean attacker latency. The top and bottom of
each line are one standard deviation away from the mean.
The first 5 victims and their corresponding attackers were
assigned the harder password ‘ths.ouR2’ and the last 5 prac-
tised on the easier password ‘serndele’. The assigned at-
tackers are generally spread out, with a mix of faster, equal
and slower attackers in typing relative to the victims.
To investigate whether it is easier for a faster attacker to
imitate a slow victim, the relative latency of each attacker
w.r.t. her victim is computed. The coefficient of correlation
between the b20 FAR in e2 and the relative latency is 0.02
and -0.12 for the harder and easier passwords respectively.
Therefore, contrary to participant’s feedback, there exists
no correlation between the typing speed and the imitation
outcome. This is shown in Figure 19.
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Figure 19. Relative latency v/s b20 FAR in e2
7.1.3 Number of trials per minute
During our experiments, we notice that participants vary
greatly in the number of samples submitted. Different at-
tackers adopt different strategy to get to their best high
score. Certain participants would submit samples after sam-
ples, while others spend more time studying and reflect-
ing on the feedback mechanism. For example some would
pause and tap on their palm to grasp the rhythm. We want
to know which approach is better and whether there is any
effect on the FAR.
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Figure 20. Tries per minute in e2
Figure 20 shows the b20 FAR in e2 against the number of
tries per minute. The coefficient of correlation is 0.069. We
found no correlation between how each attacker go about
improving their imitation and the acceptance rate. This also
suggests that there is no standard way to perform better in
imitating someone else.
7.1.4 Initial typing similarity with the victim
If an attacker’s typing pattern is already similar to the vic-
tim’s before imitation training, intuitively, one would ex-
pect that even a slight improvement would result in a notice-
able change in the FAR. In Figures 21(a), we show the b20
FAR in e2 of each attacker against the Euclidean distance
between her mean vector and that of the victim’s. In Fig-
ure 21(b), we show the b20 FAR in e2 of each attacker aga-
inst the Manhattan (scaled) distance of the attacker’s mean
vector from the victim’s mean vector (with the scaling based
on the victim’s deviation vector).
The coefficients of correlation are -0.26 and -0.38 for
Figures 21(a) and 21(b) respectively. Therefore there ex-
ists a weak correlation between the e2 imitation outcome
and the similarity between the attacker and victim’s typing
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Figure 21. Correlation between b20 FAR in
e2 and the typing similarity between attacker
and victim
pattern. From Figure 7, we can observe that the correla-
tion is weak because the extent of improvement varies for
different attackers.
7.2. Mimesis interface
In Section 5, Mimesis provided feedback in both a table
of numerical timings as well as a graph. Figure 22 shows
the preference among attackers for these 2 feedback op-
tions. There are 51 participants who relied predominantly
on the graph, while 23 relied on the raw data shown in the
tables. 6 used both and another 4 used neither. For the
latter, this implies that they relied only on the attack score
and the coloring scheme adopted. Among participants who
used the table and/or graph, feedback indicated that the re-
liance is only during the initial part of the experiment to get
the rhythm correct. Thereafter, participants usually rely on
their gut feeling to imitate.
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Figure 22. Preferences based on the feedback
7.3. Imitating hold v/s inter-keystroke timing
In this section we compare whether it is easier to imi-
tate hold timing or inter-keystroke timing. From Figure 23,
there are 42 attackers who find hold timing easy to imi-
tate and inter-keystroke timing difficult. On the other hand,
30 attackers found hold timing difficult and inter-keystroke
timing easy. 3 attackers found both are easy to imitate,
while 9 think that both are equally difficult.
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Figure 23. Easier to imitate
Notebook keyboard External keyboard
H easy, I difficult 19 23
H difficult, I easy 20 10
Table 9. Effect of the keyboard in hold timing
and inter-keystroke timing
It turned out that the type of keyboard made a difference.
Refer to Table 9. Of the 72 attackers who found one tim-
ing easy and the other difficult, 39 used their notebook’s
keyboard while 33 used an external keyboard. We found
that among those using an external keyboard, the number of
people who find hold timing easy to imitate is significantly
more than those who do not. The reason could be because
pressing and releasing of a key is more apparent in an ex-
ternal keyboard as compared to the notebook’s keyboard.
7.4. Limitations
In Section 3, it was stated that we deliberately exclude
the key up-down timing as a precaution that it may be dif-
ficult to understand and therefore affects the experimental
results. A question therefore arises on whether it is really
difficult to imitate key up-down timing. If true, it implies
that a simple countermeasure against imitation would be to
include and give a greater weight to key up-down timing
in the anomaly score calculations. We did not address this
issue in this paper and leave it as future work.
8. Related Work
Cho et al. [9] and Hwang et al. [19] explored the use of
artificial rhythms and cues to improve the quality of typing
samples. These include: (a) Breaking up a password into
multiple segments and inserting pauses in between the seg-
ments when typing. (b) The use of ‘tune, chant or rooting’
to guide the password typing. (c) Minimizing the hold time
in a “staccato” style [23]. (d) Maximizing the hold time in
a “legato” style [22]. (e) Maximizing the inter-keystroke
time in a “slow tempo” style. With such cues, users pro-
duced timing vectors that are more consistent and unique.
We considered the use of audio feedback when designing
the experiments, but found that in the context of imitation,
it is hard to infer precise information just by listening.
The work by Rundhaug et al. [18] is similar to ours
in terms of intent and general approach. They provided
the feedback to a team of attackers in three ways: a sim-
ple accept/reject feedback, a distance score feedback and
full feedback, where the attackers are able to examine each
component of their timing vectors. For each attacker, three
different passwords were used, each paired with a feedback
mechanism. Each attacker goes through 3 imitation ses-
sions, one for each password. For the full feedback, a graph
with 3 lines was plotted. The first line plots the victim’s
mean vector plus 1 standard deviation, serving as an upper
boundary. The second line plots the victims’s mean vector
minus 1 standard deviation, serving as the lower boundary.
The third line plots the attacker’s timing vector. Each at-
tacker tries to modify their typing pattern to fit their timing
line within the upper and lower boundaries of the victims.
The author concluded that differences in anomaly scores be-
fore and after training is statistically significant and imita-
tion is therefore possible. However, they also concluded
that imitation is difficult and ‘can indicate that keystroke
dynamics is a very secure authentication method when com-
bined with a password’.
9. Conclusions
This paper shows that contrary to the beliefs of prior
studies, when a victim’s typing pattern is known, imitation
is possible. If the attacker has an incomplete model of the
victim’s typing pattern, her success rate is around 0.52 after
imitation training. For the best attackers, imitation training
increases the FAR to nearly 1, rendering keystroke biomet-
rics based authentication systems unusable. Furthermore,
when the number of attackers and victims are sizeable, the
chance of a natural collision in typing pattern (without any
imitation training) is significant.
Among the key factors affecting the imitation, we found
that the easier the password, the easier the imitation. Males
were also found to be better at imitation compared to fe-
males. On the other hand, various factors such as use of
external keyboard, typing consistency, typing speed, imita-
tion strategy and similarities in typing patterns were found
to have much less influence on the imitation outcome.
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